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THE GOVERNMENT SUSPENSION
PROVISION OF THE CLAYTON ACT'S
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: FOR WHOM
DOES IT TOLL?
CHARLES EVAN STEWART*
INTRODUCTION
Section 4B of the Clayton Act prescribes a four-year period of
limitations for private damage claims arising from alleged antitrust
injury.1 Under this statutory provision, a complaint must be filed
within four years after the antitrust cause of action accrued or it
* Member of the New York Bar. Cornell University, B.A., 1974; J.D., 1977.
See Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 730-40 (1914), amended by Act of July 7, 1955,
ch. 283, § 4B, 69 Stat. 282, 282-83 and Act of Sept. 30, 1976, 90 Stat. 1396 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982)). Section 4B provides in pertinent part:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections 4, 4A, or 4C of this title
shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of
action accrued. No cause of action barred under existing law on the effective date
of this Act shall be revived by this Act.
Id.
The primary reason Congress enacted § 4B was to prevent forum shopping. See S. REP.
No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2328, 2330-
31 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 6191. The "evil" of forum-shopping existed because,
prior to the addition of § 4B, the period of limitations applicable to private treble damage
actions arising under the Clayton Act was governed by state statutes of limitations. See
Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821
(1961). Since the plaintiff's injury could have occurred in a number of states, the plaintiff
would often forum shop for the state with the most favorable statute of limitations. See S.
REP. No. 619, supra, at 2330-31. Section 4B put an end to forum-shopping by establishing a
national period of limitations. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 312 F. Supp.
358, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
A second and related goal of Congress in enacting § 4B was to guarantee uniformity in
determining the appropriate limitations period for private antitrust claims, as well as cer-
tainty not provided by state statutes of limitations. See City of Burbank v. General Elec.
Co., 329 F.2d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 1964); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
326 F.2d 575, 579-80 (9th Cir. 1964); Wheeler & Jones, The Statute of Limitations for Anti-
trust Damage Actions: Four Years or Forty? 41 U. CHL L. REv. 72, 83 (1973). The uniform
period of limitations was thus designed to eliminate the possibility that a defendant would
be placed "in constant jeopardy until the longest period of limitations ha[d] transpired." S.
REP. No. 619, supra, at 2331; see Glazer Steel Corp. v. Toyomenka, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 500,
503 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (national period of limitations gives defendant peace of mind by not
permitting him to be surprised by "stale causes of action of which [he is] unaware").
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will be forever barred." The period begins to run on the date of the
"commission of the last overt act causing injury or damage."'
When a plaintiff alleges a continuing conspiracy,4 the statute has
been interpreted to mean "that each time a plaintiff is injured by
an act of the defendants a cause of action accrues to him to recover
the damages caused by that act and that, as to those damages, the
statute of limitations runs from the commission of the act."' In
short, under section 4B, a plaintiff may recover damages for al-
2 Clayton Act § 4B, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982).
3 Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp., 496 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 997 (1974); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338
(1971) (period of limitations for conspiracy to violate antitrust laws runs from commission
of act); Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336, 337 (10th Cir.) (cause of action for
antitrust claim accrues on date defendant commits act which injures plaintiff's business),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1090 (1982); Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts., Inc., 587 F.2d
127, 137 (3d Cir. 1978) (limitations period only runs when damages are "inflicted and ascer-
tainable"). When the last overt act did not occur within the four-year period required by §
4B, the action is time-barred. See, e.g., National Souvenir Center, Inc. v. Historic Figures,
Inc., 728 F.2d 503, 512-13 (D.C. Cir.) (action for illegal tying of franchises of wax museums
to initial sale or lease through overt act prohibited), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 103 (1984);
Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 552 F. Supp. 589, 595-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (overt acts that
allegedly caused damages occurred too long before time permitted by § 4B).
4 See, e.g., Electroglas, Inc. v. Dynatex Corp., 497 F. Supp. 97, 105 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
(question was whether amendment in distributorship agreement continued conspiracy found
in original agreement); Woolen v. Suntran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025, 1035-36 (N.D.
Tex. 1978) (cab drivers' claim accrued each time they were denied right to pick up passen-
gers at airport).
6 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971); see In re
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 771 F.2d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3411
(U.S. Dec. 16, 1985) (No. 85-737); Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 546
F.2d 570, 572-73 (4th Cir. 1976); Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d
117, 126-28 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); 2 P. AREDA & D. TURNER,
ANTrrRUST LAW § 325b (1978). Congress, in enacting § 4B of the Clayton Act in 1955, re-
jected "discovery-type" limitations provisions - which would toll the limitations period in
antitrust cases until such time as a plaintiff could discover facts upon which its claim is
based - in favor of the accrual standard explicitly set forth in the statute. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Seass. (1949) (proposed "discovery-type" statutes which were re-
jected); H.R. REP. No. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Seass. (1950) (same). The congressional hearings
and debates reflect Congress' favorable disposition towards an accrual standard. See Hear-
ings before the Subcomm. on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); 101 CONG. REc. 5129, 5132 (1955). For example, in a debate
on the floor of the House of Representatives, Representative Celler pointed to the danger of
enacting a discovery-type limitations provision by stating- "The statute of limitations will
start running from the time the action accrues, not from the time of discovery. If you make
it time of discovery, then you practically have no statute of limitations at all." 101 CONG.
REC. 5129, 5132-33 (1955). Several courts have cited the legislative history of § 4B in apply-
ing the accrual standard. See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 239-
41 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963); Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co.,
310 F.2d 271, 278-80 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912 (1962), 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
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leged injurious acts only if he commences an action within four
years of the particular injurious act.
Notwithstanding the four-year bar provision, there are certain
circumstances that can operate to suspend or toll the antitrust
statute of limitations, giving a plaintiff an extended period in
which to bring suit.' The focus of this Article is on one such cir-
cumstance-section 5(i) of the Clayton Act;7 under that provision
6 The statute of limitations for antitrust claims may be tolled for, inter alia, fraudulent
concealment. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 5, at § 325d; 8 J. VON KALINOWSKI,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 103.03 (1985). The purpose of the tolling provi-
sion in cases of concealment is "neither [to] reward the wrongdoing defendant nor deprive
the unknowing plaintiff of his compensation." 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 5, at §
325d. There is no tolling for fraudulent concealment, however, if the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the facts constituting an antitrust claim. See Norton-Children's
Hosps., Inc. v. James E. Smith & Sons, Inc., 658 F.2d 440, 441-43 (6th Cir. 1981); Rutledge
v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1978); Willmar Poultry Co.
v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1975). Thus, a plaintiff is ex-
pected to have exercised "due diligence" to have discovered the fraud, see Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Burlington, 351 F.2d 762, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and if he has, he is permitted
the full statutory period from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud to commence an
action, see Norton-Children's Hosps., 658 F.2d at 443; Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound
Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 831 (1980). See generally
Comment, Fraudulent Concealment as Tolling the Antitrust Statute of Limitations, 36
FORDHAM L. REV. 328, 329 (1967) (statute tolled if fraud affirmatively concealed); Comment,
Intent to Conceal: Tolling the Antitrust Statute of Limitations Under the Fraudulent
Concealment Doctrine, 64 GEo. L.J. 791, 791 (1976) (same); infra note 69 (discussion of
fraudulent concealment doctrine).
In addition to actions by a defendant that can toll the period of limitations, the institu-
tion of a class action will also toll the statutory period. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v.
Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1983); see also Note, Antitrust Law-Class Actions-Tolling
of Federal Statutes of Limitations-American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 15 B.C.
INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 1010 (1974) (tolling of limitations period for class actions may allow
some class members to derive unjust benefit at expense of defendant). Moreover, it has been
held that a plaintiff's commencement of a private treble damage antitrust action by filing a
complaint tolls the period of limitations under § 4B of the Clayton Act. See Moore Co. v.
Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 347 F.2d 921, 922 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 925 (1966).
See Clayton Act § 5(i), 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1982), which provides:
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States
to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not in-
cluding an action under section 4A, the running of the statute of limitations in
respect of every private or State right of action arising under said laws and based
in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be sus-
pended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: Provided, how-
ever, That whenever the running of the statute of limitations in respect of a cause
of action arising under section 4 or 4c is suspended hereunder, any action to en-
force such cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced either within
the period of suspension or within four years after the cause of action accrued.
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private plaintiffs may take advantage of the suspension of the stat-
ute of limitations during, and for up to one year after, the pen-
dency of a government action.8 At the conclusion of the one year
period, any suit based upon a government proceeding is time-
barred.9
Although this provision appears straightforward, nearly every
aspect of section 5(i) has been litigated, often with conflicting re-
sults. 10 This Article will examine the congressional purposes in en-
acting section 5(i) and will chart the jagged course of the various
court rulings that have attempted to implement those purposes,
with the aim of placing future litigants on notice of the opportuni-
ties and risks posed by section 5(i).
I.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOLLING PROVISION
Prior to 1955, there was no federal antitrust statute of limita-
tions; federal courts were empowered to utilize applicable state
0 Id. The government is not a private litigant for purposes of the § 5(i) tolling provi-
sion, even when the government commences an action for single damages on the basis of an
earlier action for equitable relief. Maricopa County v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F.
Supp. 77, 83, 86 (D. Ariz. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 431 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 937 (1971); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 305 F. Supp. 285, 287
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). But see Chipanno v. Champion Int'l Corp., 702 F.2d 827, 833 (9th Cir.
1983) (section 5(i) applicable when government commences single-damage action and seeks
injunction).
0 Clayton Act § 5(i), 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1982); see, e.g., Dungan v. Morgan Drive-Away,
Inc., 570 F.2d 867, 871 (9th Cir.) (limitations period tolled until return of indictment), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d
1347, 1363 (5th Cir. 1976) (government action no longer "pending" once consent decree en-
tered), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
The Supreme Court articulated the purpose underlying the enactment of § 5(i) as being
"to assist private litigants in utilizing any benefits they might cull from government anti-
trust actions." Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 317 (1965). Section 5(i) permits victims of antitrust violations to recover damages based
on the facts and judgments proved in suits by the government against the same or related
defendants. Id. at 318. The statute of limitations runs against such victims/plaintiffs only
from the date of the conclusion of the suit by the government. Id. One significant, and often
litigated, issue is at which procedural point and date the "pendency" of a government pro-
ceeding concludes. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
10 Compare, e.g., Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967,
974 (D. Me. 1963) (FTC proceedings not capable of tolling statute) with Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 320-22 (1965) (FTC proceed-
ings toll statute to same extent as Justice Department actions). The limitation aspect of § 5
was initially viewed as having generated little controversy. Simon, The Private Litigant and
Prior Government Judgments or Decrees, 7 ANTTRUST BuLL. 27, 27 (1962).
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statutes of limitations.11 Under the original tolling provision set
forth in the Clayton Act of 1914, the "applicable" statute of limita-
tions was suspended during the pendency of the government's
suit.12 That provision created widespread confusion, however, be-
cause of the great differences between the statutes of limitations of
each state.1 3 Thus, in 1955 when Congress enacted a uniform pe-
riod of limitations of four years, it also recognized the need to ad-
dress the issue of tolling the limitations period for private parties
during a suit by the government. 4 In an effort to bring "certainty
" See supra note 1. For an example of the havoc resulting from the application of state
statutes of limitations, see Northern Ky. Tel. Co. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 73 F.2d
333, 335 (6th Cir. 1934) (court applied one-year conspiracy statute instead of five-year limi-
tations period applicable for statutory liability), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 719 (1935); Reid v.
Doubleday & Co., 109 F. Supp. 354, 363-64 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (court applied six-year limita-
tions period applicable for statutory liability instead of one-year period applicable to actions
based on statute imposing penalty or forfeiture). Although the different limitations periods
ranged from one to twenty years, the Senate Judiciary Committee, in passing the uniform
statute, noted that the perceptible trend of periods of limitations for antitrust actions was
toward shorter periods, that the states in which the greatest number of suits had arisen had
four-year limitations periods, and that the average period for all forty-eight states was
around four years (4.85 years). See 100 CONG. REc. 5130 (1955) (remarks of Rep. Keating);
see also TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 30,201-35,532 (compilation of fifty states' antitrust stat-
utes, including limitations periods).
12 See Clayton Act of 1914 § 5, 38 Stat. 731. Section 5 provided in pertinent part:
Whenever any suit or proceeding in equity or criminal prosecution is instituted by
the United States to prevent, restrain or punish violations of any of the antitrust
laws, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of each and every private
right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter
complained of in said suit or proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency
thereof.
Id.
13 See S. REP. No. 619, supra note 1, at 2331; see also 101 CONG. REC. 5129, 5129 (1955)
(statement of Rep. Celler) (states had one, three, four, five, six, and up to twenty-year stat-
utes of limitations for federal antitrust actions).
1" See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Study of Monopoly Power of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1950). Congress had debated the issue of a
federal antitrust statute of limitations since 1949, see S. REP. No. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949), but it was not until the 84th Congress that the suspension provision was actually
addressed. Indeed, the prior legislative proposals specifically excluded such a provision and,
in a 1950 hearing before the House of Representatives, the rationale for not including a
tolling provision was explained by the Department of Justice's representative in terms of
the variety of circumstances in which a private individual could take advantage of the gov-
ernment's action. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Study of Monopoly Power of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1950).
We question ... the advisability of amending section 5 of the Clayton Act to
provide for tolling the statute of limitations with respect to private suits where the
Government has instituted suit for damages. Only rarely will the Government's
action be of significance to third parties since, unlike the typical antritrust viola-
tion, the damage is likely to be confined to the Government and not extend to
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and predictability" to the application of section 5(i), 15 Congress
amended the Clayton Act to allow private plaintiffs to sue either
within one year after the end of the government's suit or within
four years after the cause of action accrued. The latter is the fed-
eral limitations period established and set forth in section 4B.11
The Senate Judiciary Committee articulated the rationale for
the one year provision:
The plaintiff in a treble-damage action may find himself hard
pressed to reap the benefits of the Government suit if, upon its
conclusion, he has but a short time remaining to study the Gov-
ernment's case, estimate his own damages, assess the strength
and validity of his suit, and prepare and file his complaint ....
[The one additional year provision] would guarantee all plaintiffs
an adequate period in which to take advantage of Government
antitrust proceedings. 17
private persons. But in any event, we feel the Government suit should be viewed
as more analogous to the private remedial action than to the usual civil or crimi-
nal action brought for the benefit of the competitive economy as a whole. Conse-
quently, recovery or denial of recovery by the private plaintiff should not depend
upon the fortuity of the Government's bringing or not bringing a suit for the dam-
ages accruing to it as a Government.
Id.; see also Korman, The Antitrust Plaintiff Following in the Government's Footsteps, 16
VIL. L. REV. 57, 59 (1970) (tolling provision assists litigants in following government suit).
" Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 335 (1978); see 101 CONG.
REC. 5129, 5130 (1955) (statement of Rep. Keating).
" See Clayton Act § 4B, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982).
1 7 See S. REP. No. 619, supra note 1, at 2332. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
"While the Committee considers it highly desirable to toll the statute of limitations during a
Government antitrust action and to grant plaintiff a reasonable time thereafter in which to
bring suit, it does not believe that the undue prolongation is conducive to effective and
efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws." Id. at 2333. Section 4 of the Clayton Act states
that "any person who shall be injured ... by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws ... shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained . . . ." Clayton Act § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). The United States Supreme Court has recognized three primary pur-
poses for allowing treble damage awards in private antitrust actions. First, the award is seen
as compensation for the economic damage to the plaintiff caused by a defendant's antitrust
violation. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (sec-
tion 4 was to be a remedial statute). The second purpose was the punishment of the viola-
tors. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981). Related to
this purpose was the congressional intent to deprive wrongdoers of the "fruits of their ille-
gality." Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). Finally,
the Court has held that the threat of possible treble damage awards was an effective deter-
rence to future violations of the antitrust laws. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
For the purposes of punishment and deterrence, the Court has viewed the private plain-
tiff to be a vindicator of the public interests in the free enterprise system, see Fortner En-
ters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969), and the public interest in
the enforcement of the antitrust laws, see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
1985]
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Thus, Congress wanted to ensure that, even if the four year period
was about to run out at the conclusion of a government suit, a pri-
vate litigant would still be entitled to a reasonable period thereaf-
ter in which to sue.18 Alternatively, the regular four year limita-
tions period, which might extend beyond the termination of the
one year period depending upon the accrual date of the cause of
action, would also be available to the plaintiff.19
Notwithstanding the congressional intention of giving private
plaintiffs adequate time to prepare their suits, the Judiciary Com-
mittee recognized that "the long duration of such proceedings
taken in conjuction with a lengthy statute of limitations may tend
to prolong stale claims, unduly impair efficient business operations,
and overburden the calendars of courts. ' 20 In light of the Commit-
tee's belief that undue prolongation would not be "conducive to
effective and efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws," it was
expected that the one year tolling provision, in conjunction with
the uniform federal statute of limitations, would "tend to shorten
the period over which private treble-damages actions [would] ex-
tend. ' 21 Accordingly, by enacting the one year tolling provision,
395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969). Plaintiffs in this capacity have been called "private attorneys
general." See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). Treble damages, there-
fore, were to encourage "private attorneys general" to bring suit by overcoming the burdens
and costs of litigation. See S. REP. No. 619, supra note 1, at 2329; see also American Soc'y of
Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 (1982) (discussion of the
purposes of treble damages); Note, Redefining the "Cost of Suit" Under Section Four of
the Clayton Act, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1905, 1917-23 (1984) (same).
"I See S. REP. No. 619, supra note 1, at 2332; Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,
300 F.2d 561, 567-69 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); Bagdasarian,
Government Damage Suits and Role in Private Antitrust Suits, in TREBLE DAMAGE Ac-
TIONs 21 (G. Reycraft ed. 1970); Note, supra note 6, at 1156-57; cf. Chipanno v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 702 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1983) (section 5(i) encourages private antitrust ac-
tions by allowing plaintiff more time to prepare case).
'0 See 15 U.S.C. § 16(i); S. REP. No. 619, supra note 1, at 2333; see also Russ Togs, Inc.
v. Grinnell Corp., 426 F.2d 850, 852 (2d Cir.) (private plaintiffs received benefit of tolling
provision by filing suit within one year of conclusion of government action), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 878 (1970).
20 S. REP. No. 619, supra note 1, at 2333.
21 Id. On the floor of the House of Representatives, Congressman Keating, a sponsor of
the amendments, stated that the purpose of the new tolling provision was two-fold: first, to
give injured parties an "adequate time in which to take advantage of the Government's
antitrust proceedings"; and second, "to prevent undue and lengthy prolongation of stale
claims." 101 CONG. REc. 5129, 5130 (1955). Congressman Keating added that by offering
private parties the new tolling provision, or four years after the accrual date, "plaintiffs will
not be afforded time to procrastinate and delay." Id.; see also id. at 5131 (remarks of Cong.
Rogers). The tension Congress intended to create through the statute and the tolling provi-
sion-a tension between time of repose for the defendant and necessity of adjudicating anti-
[Vol. 60:70
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Congress wanted to allow private litigants to benefit from the gov-
ernment's antitrust efforts with reasonable promptness in a limita-
tions period that could be calculated with certainty.
22
II.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TOLLING PROVISION
Since the 1955 enactment of section 5(i), courts have struggled
in applying the tolling provision to a myriad of private parties, all
of whom have attempted to invoke the statute to bar or avoid the
bar of section 4B.23 Litigants, in advocating their positions, and
courts, in attempting to make sense of section 5(i), have principally
focused upon four key phrases in section 5(i). Unfortunately, to a
great extent the intent of Congress has been blurred as a result.
A. A "Civil or Criminal Proceeding"
Section 5(i) requires that the suit "instituted" by the govern-
ment be a "civil or criminal proceeding... to prevent, restrain or
punish violations of any of the antitrust laws. '24 Although most
trust claims before they became stale-was recognized and articulated by the court in Mari-
copa County v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp. 77, 85-86 (D. Ariz. 1969), aff'd,
431 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 937 (1971).
22 S. REP. No. 619, supra note 1, at 2332.
23 See, e.g., Dungan v. Morgan Drive-Away, Inc., 570 F.2d 867, 868 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Stewart Aviation Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 372 F. Supp. 876,
877-78 (M.D. Pa. 1974). In Dungan, plaintiff instituted an antitrust treble damage action
against the defendant on August 20, 1975. See 570 F.2d at 868. The plaintiff conceded that
the date of accrual of the action was no later than April 23, 1969, more than six years before
the date on which the plaintiff commenced the action. Id. Though the claim appeared to be
barred by § 43, the plaintiff attempted to invoke the tolling provision of the Clayton Act to
make the action timely. Id. However, since the government action commenced on August 2,
1973, the court held that the tolling provision did not make the action timely; the four year
statute of limitations under § 4B had already run before the government instituted its pro-
ceeding against the defendant. Id. at 869.
In Stewart, the plaintiff brought a civil antitrust treble damage action against Piper
Aircraft on February 12, 1968, for violations of the Sherman Act. 372 F. Supp. at 877. Previ-
ously, the federal government had commenced an action against the same defendant. Id. at
878. The government action was instituted on April 10, 1964, and terminated on June 16,
1966. Id. Piper Aircraft attempted to invoke § 4B to prevent the plaintiff from recovering
damages for violations occurring before February 12, 1964, since the plaintiff instituted the
private action four years from this date. Id. at 877. The court held that, since the plaintiff
did not bring his action within the one-year suspension period after termination of the gov-
ernment suit, he could recover damages only for injuries sustained after February 11, 1964.
Id. at 877-78.
24 Clayton Act § 5(i), 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1982).
The term "antitrust law" within the meaning of § 5(i) is defined in § 1 of the Clayton
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private treble-damage litigants have sought to employ section 5(i)
in the wake of a government criminal suit or civil action seeking
injunctive relief,2 5 a number of private plaintiffs have successfully
stretched the liberal language of that portion of the statute.
In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. New Jersey
Wood Finishing Co., 26 the plaintiff contended that a proceeding by
the Federal Trade Commission under section 7 of the Clayton Act
against one of two defendants tolled section 4B of the Clayton
Act. The Supreme Court, while conceding that "there is little in
the legislative history to suggest that Congress consciously in-
tended to include Commission actions within the sweep of the toll-
ing provision . . . [and] that the precise language of section 5(b)
does not clearly encompass Commission proceedings, "28 neverthe-
Act and includes the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and §§ 73-77 of the Wilson Tariff Act
of 1894. See 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982). Neither § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, id. §
45 (1982), nor § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, id. § 13a (1982), is included in that defini-
tion. See id. § 12 (1982); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 376 (1958)
(section 3 of Robinson-Patman Act); Lippa's, Inc. v. Lenox, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 182, 186 (D.
Vt. 1969) (FTC Act).
215 See Korman, The Antitrust Plaintiff Following in the Government's Footsteps, 16
VILL. L. REv. 57, 57 (1970) (large percentage of private antitrust actions filed because of
information disclosed in prior government civil or criminal antitrust actions); Chipanno v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 702 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 1983). In Chipanno, the plaintiff's private
action was based in part on prior government civil and criminal proceedings. See 702 F.2d
at 829. A conspiracy charge based on the same facts in the government action formed the
basis for the plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 832. Because of the prior government action, the
private litigant could take advantage of the tolling provisions of § 5(i). Id.; see also Marine
Firemen's Union v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 503 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1974)
(criminal proceeding); Chambers & Barber, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 60
F.R.D. 455, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (civil injunctive action); Maricopa County v. American Pipe
& Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp. 77, 82, 87 (D. Ariz. 1969) (criminal proceeding, suit for single
damages under § 4A of the Clayton Act and suit for injunctive relief), aff'd, 431 F.2d 1145
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 937 (1971).
:e 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
" Id. at 313. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. filed its original complaint on November
20, 1961, alleging violations of § 7 of the Clayton Act by Minnesota Mining in 1956. Id.
Minnesota Mining raised the defense of the statute of limitations under § 4B of the Clayton
Act. Id. In 1960, however, the FTC had filed a § 7 proceeding against Minnesota Mining,
which concluded in a consent order, dated August 24, 1961, directing the defendant to
divest itself of improperly acquired assets. Id. at 315. Consequently, the New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co. asserted that this FTC proceeding tolled the four-year statute of limitations,
and that its action was timely since the suit had been instituted within one year of the
termination of the FTC action. Id. at 313.
28 Id. at 320-21. The Court in Minnesota Mining noted that there is no mention in the
record of the 1914 legislative proceedings as to whether Commission actions would enable
the invocation of the tolling provision. Id. While the Court acknowledged that the precise
wording of § 5(i) does not include FTC proceedings, it stated that the literal wording was
not controlling in this instance. Id. at 321. Instead, the Court declared that it was necessary
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less agreed that the tolling provision applied.29 In permitting the
provision to be invoked, a majority of the Court stated that it was
giving "effect to Congress' basic policy objectives in enacting sec-
tion 5(i)-objectives which would be frustrated... [if] large num-
bers of private litigants [were deprived] of the benefits of govern-
ment antitrust suits simply because those suits were pursued by
one governmental agency rather than the other." 3o
Based upon the Court's extremely expansive reading of con-
gressional intent, subsequent courts were not reluctant to extend
the boundaries of what constituted a "proceeding" for the pur-
poses of section 5(i).31 Thus, for example, several courts have held
that a Federal Trade Commission proceeding under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act tolls section 4B because, even
though the FTC Act is not an "antitrust law,"32 a section 5 pro-
to examine the underlying purposes and policies of the tolling provision. Id.
Justice Black's strongly worded dissent took the majority to task because there was no
support in the statute or the legislative history to conclude that FTC proceedings should be
pulled within the scope of section 5(i). Id. at 324-25 (Black, J., dissenting).
2'9 Id. at 321-22.
30 Id. at 322. In light of congressional silence, the Court relied "on the one element of
congressional intention which is plain on the record-the clearly expressed desire that pri-
vate parties be permitted the benefits of prior government actions." Id. at 320. To further
this congressional objective the Court reasoned that, since FTC proceedings constitute a
major portion of government enforcement efforts in the antitrust field, the tolling provision
should include FTC proceedings. Id. at 320-21. The Court ruled that FTC proceedings are
just as much government actions as are Justice Department antitrust suits and relied, not
only on the legislative history of the amendments, but also on the interrelationship of § 5(a)
of the Clayton Act (the prima facie effect of judgments or decrees in subsequent civil suits)
with § 5(i). See id. at 316-18; Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558,
568 (1951); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 569 (10th Cir. 1962);
infra note 53.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota Mining, several federal courts had
determined that FTC proceedings were not government actions capable of tolling the anti-
trust statute of limitations for private suits. See, e.g., Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. For-
ster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967, 974 (D. Me. 1963) (FTC proceedings do not toll statute);
Valasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. 712, 713 (E.D. Tenn.
1963)(FTC proceeding does not suspend running of statute); Highland Supply Corp. v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 221 F. Supp. 15, 17 (E.D. Mo. 1963) (judicial, not administrative, pro-
ceeding), rev'd on other grounds, 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
-1 E.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Lippa's, Inc. v. Lenox, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 182, 186 (D. Vt. 1969). But see Laitram Corp. v.
Deepsouth Packing Co., 279 F. Supp. 883, 891 (E.D. La. 1968)(FTC proceeding based only
on § 5 of FTC Act does not toll statute of limitations because proceeding may not be for
violation of antitrust law).
22 Section 5 of the FTC Act is directed toward "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1) (1982); see FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972).
This section of the FTC Act enables the FTC "to define and proscribe an unfair competitive
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ceeding "restrains" a violation of the "antitrust laws."33
In recent years, however, the judiciary, led by the Supreme
Court, has become more restrained, unwilling to permit just any
government proceeding to toll the limitations period.3 4 Private
treble damage suits, based on government proceedings that were
initiated by private litigants, have not received section 5(i) re-
lief-even though antitrust issues were raised-because they were
not "instituted by the United States."3 5 Neither have grand jury
practice, even though the practice does not infringe. . . [upon] antitrust laws." 405 U.S. at
239. Commentators have been concerned about the attempt to use § 5 of the FTC Act to
create a source of antitrust enforcement authority in addition to that of the Sherman or
Clayton Acts. See Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CH. L. REv. 47, 52 (1969);
accord Aranson, Gelhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1982). Posner criticized the FTC for its operational inefficiency and overall ineffec-
tiveness in eliminating trade restraints, see Posner, supra, at 87, and stated that extensions
of antitrust enforcement under § 5 of the FTC Act are "highly questionable," id. at 52.
Posner concluded by arguing that the scope of the Commission's authority in the antitrust
area should be limited or eliminated. Id. at 88. Contra Comments of the AntiTrust Division
of the Justice Department on the "Ash Council" Report, 57 VA. L. REv. 933, 944-46
(1971)(FTC should not be abolished or reduced since flaws are result of congressional
restraints).
3 See Rader v. Balfour, 440 F.2d 469, 471-73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983
(1971). The FTC proceeding in Rader was based on a violation of § 5 of the FTC Act, which
authorizes the FTC to commence a proceeding for a cease and desist order. See id. at 471.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pointed out that § 5 of the Act is not one of
the antitrust laws enumerated in the Clayton Act and that conduct deemed unlawful under
this section may not be a violation of an antitrust law. See id. However, the court did ac-
knowledge that, in some instances, underlying the § 5 proceedings is conduct that does vio-
late antitrust laws, id. at 471, and that the FTCA proceeding is intended at least "to pre-
vent, if not to restrain or punish" such violations, id. at 473; Luria Steel & Trade Co. v.
Ogden Corp., 484 F.2d 1016, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974). The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Luria relied on the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Rader, in determining that the § 5 proceeding may toll the statute of limitations under the
Clayton Act. See 484 F.2d at 1020-21. It distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Min-
nesota Mining on the ground that the Minnesota Mining Court did not address the issue of
whether a proceeding alleging violations of § 5 of the FTC Act can trigger the tolling provi-
sion of the Clayton Act. See id.
31 See Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUm. L. REV. 1363, 1414 (1978).
" See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 331 (1978); City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 538 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(action before Nuclear Regulatory Commission prompted by Attorney General's communi-
cation). In Greyhound, a private party instituted a proceeding before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission requesting that it reopen proceedings against the petitioner bus com-
pany and alleging that the petitioner had not "lived up to representations that the
acquisitions [by petitioner] would not adversely affect respondent." 437 U.S. at 322. Because
of the gravity of the charges against the petitioner, the United States intervened in the
action. Id. The Court of Appeals below had concluded that government intervention in a
private antitrust suit was the "functional equivalent" of an action instituted directly by
them. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 700 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated
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investigations been considered "proceedings" because the empanel-
ling of that body in and of itself does not result in the enforcement
of the antitrust laws-the investigation does not "prevent, restrain,
or punish" within the meaning of section 5(i).36
B. "Based In Whole Or In Part"
To invoke section 5(i) successfully, a private litigant must
demonstrate that the cause of action is "based in whole or in part
on any matter complained of" in a proceeding brought by the gov-
ernment.3 7 When interpreting that language courts have generally
compared the two complaints;38 they have not required, however,
that the issues in,39 or the parties to,40 the two proceedings be
and remanded, 437 U.S. 322 (1978) . The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's determi-
nation because "[a] functional-equivalence standard, applied this loosely, resurrects the very
confusion and uncertainty concerning the application of the statute of limitations that Con-
gress sought to eliminate in the 1955 amendments." 437 U.S. at 335. It therefore held the §
5(i) tolling provisions inapplicable. Id. at 336-37. The Supreme Court noted, however, that
in some instances the tolling provision might be triggered under equitable principles, rather
than under § 5(i). Id. at 337 n.21.
Another factor that justifies the outcome of these cases is the fact that the government
agencies involved did not possess the authority under the antitrust laws to enforce those
laws. See Handler, supra note 34, at 1414-15. Thus, even if the federal government had
initiated the ICC proceeding in Greyhound, the issue involved in that proceeding-whether
certain representations made by Greyhound at the time it received ICC approval for several
route acquisitions were being honored-was not an issue of the violation of antitrust laws,
and, therefore, not enforceable by the federal government. See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 104
M.C.C. 449, 459-63 (1968). Indeed, the issue involved in Greyhound was that of contempt
for violation of the earlier court orders. See United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529
(7th Cir. 1974) (affirmed both lower courts' decisions due to willful violations of criminal
and civil orders), af'g 370 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill.) and 363 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. m. 1973).
Therefore, the tolling provision of § 5(i) would not have been available in the subsequent
private action. See Handler, supra note 34, at 1414-15.
" Dungan v. Morgan Drive-Away, Inc., 570 F.2d 867, 871 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 829 (1978); see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 987 n.7 (D. Conn. 1978)
(tolling period starts with FTC complaint, not investigation), afj'd in part and remanded on
other grounds, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982)
'7 Clayton Act § 5(i), 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1982).
" See Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 65 (1965) (private litigant's com-
plaint must be compared to government complaint to determine if tolling provision applies);
Chipanno v. Champion, 702 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1983) (whether statute tolled depends
only upon "comparison of the two complaints on their face," not on outcome of government
litigation); Lippa's, Inc. v. Lenox, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 182, 190 (D. Vt. 1969) (allegations in
both complaints must present "substantially the same claims" to toll statute of limitations).
" See, e.g., Chipanno v. Champion, 702 F.2d 827, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1983) (private liti-
gant alleged broader conspiracy than did government); In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 70
F.R.D. 29, 33 (D. Conn. 1976) (private litigant alleged horizontal and vertical conspiracies,
whereas government alleged only vertical conspiracy); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
333 F. Supp. 317, 320-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (government alleged domestic conspiracy, whereas
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identical. Rather, they have taken their cue from three significant
Supreme Court decisions that stressed the "in part" and "any mat-
ter" language.41
The first decision interpreting this phrase was Minnesota
Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.42
Besides addressing the issue of whether an FTC administrative
proceeding was a "proceeding" for the purposes of the statute,43
the Minnesota Mining Court also considered whether the private
litigant's claims under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act were
barred because the FTC proceeding was brought under section 7 of
the Clayton Act. The Court determined that the difference be-
tween the allegations was "a distinction without a difference," rea-
soning that "[t]he fact that [the private plaintiff] claims that the
same conduct has a greater anti-competitive effect does not make
the conduct challenged any less a matter complained of in the gov-
private plaintiffs alleged domestic and international conspiracy); Lippa's, Inc. v. Lenox, Inc.,
305 F. Supp. 182, 190 (D. Vt. 1969) (although totally identical issues not raised, tolling
provision applied because there was "substantial identity"). But see Maricopa County v.
American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp. 77, 89-90 (D. Ariz. 1969) (proceeding brought
pursuant to § 7 of Clayton Act did not toll period for subsequent action brought pursuant to
§§ 1 and 2 of Sherman Act), aff'd per curiam, 431 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 937 (1971).
40 See, e.g., Rader v. Balfour, 440 F.2d 469, 473-74 (7th Cir.) (155 out of 156 defendants
the same in each proceeding), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971); New Jersey v. Morton Salt
Co., 387 F.2d 94, 95-97 (3d Cir. 1967) (only some defendants in government action named in
civil suit; only one appellee before Third Circuit also defendant in government action), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 967 (1968); Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768, 775 (8th Cir.) (tolling
provision applied when co-conspirator named in government proceeding even though not
named as defendant), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967); cf. Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259
F. Supp. 35, 74 (unnamed parties could be joined if from within six-state area covered by
government proceeding), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377
F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967). But see Aurora Enter. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 688 F.2d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 1982) (individual government suits against
NBC's rival networks did not toll limitations period given that government did not allege
conspiracy among networks), aff'g in relevant part 529 F. Supp. 655, 661 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
"' See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text; see also 8 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra
note 6, at § 103.03[2].
42 381 U.S. 311 (1965). Prior to Minnesota Mining most courts, drawing on the concept
of collateral estoppel, had restrictively viewed the "based in whole or in part" language,
usually requiring that the private complaint plead the same acts and conspiracy as alleged
by the government. See, e.g., Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 330 F.2d 288, 301 (9th Cir.
1964) (tolling provision not applicable because neither party named in government action
nor time of conspiracy were identical), rev'd, 382 U.S. 54 (1965) (rejecting Ninth Circuit's
collateral estoppel analysis); Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190, 196, 198
(9th Cir. 1956) (when allegations of conspiracy by private party not sufficiently similar to
allegations in government action, statute of limitations not tolled).
"1 381 U.S. at 314.
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ernment action. 44
In Leh v. General Petroleum Corp.45 the Supreme Court was
confronted with a different issue. While the same antitrust provi-
sions were invoked in both the government and private proceed-
ings, the allegations in each proceeding were significantly different
with respect to time period,46 geographic scope,47 and alleged
wrongdoers. 48 The Court, building upon Minnesota Mining, mini-
mized those distinctions:
44 Id. at 323. The Minnesota Mining Court stated that the only significant difference
between the government suit and the private action was that of burden of proof for the
private plaintiff under the Sherman Act. Id. at 323-24.
41 382 U.S. 54 (1965).
46 See id. at 57. The government's civil complaint in Leh, which was initiated in May of
1950, alleged that the conspiracy covered the years 1936-1950. Id. at 60. The private plain-
tiffs charged that the conspiracy for which they sought damages covered the years 1948-
1956. Id. at 61. That the Supreme Court's analysis was result-oriented is evidenced by its
failure to mention the illogical proposition that the defendants' conspiracy -as alleged by
the private plaintiffs-would have continued on for six years after the government had initi-
ated its suit to punish the same conspiracy. Id. at 55-66. The Court merely termed the time
difference "without significance". Id. at 64.
47 See id. at 57. In Leh the government alleged that the geographical center of the
conspiracy was located in the pacific states area. Id. at 60. The private plaintiffs, on the
other hand, identified southern California as the focus of the conspiracy. Id. at 61. Undoubt-
edly, the plaintiffs pointed to the narrower area as the focal point of the conspiracy because
that is where their principal place of business was located, and therefore, where they suf-
fered injury. Id. at 61-62.
48 See id. at 63. In Leh the government's complaint named eight defendants. Id. at 60.
In the private suit, two of those eight were not named as defendants, and the plaintiffs
named as an additional defendant an individual not a party to the government suit. Id. at
61. The Supreme Court viewed tfiis as "substantial identity of parties." Id. at 63. The Court
explained:
In suits of this kind, the absence of complete identity of defendants may be
explained on several grounds unrelated to the question of whether the private
claimant's suit is based on matters of which the Government complained. In the
interim between the filing of the two actions it may have become apparent that a
party named as a defendant by the Government was in fact not a party to the
antitrust violation alleged. Or the private plaintiff may prefer to limit his suit to
the defendants named by the Government whose activities contributed most di-
rectly to the injury of which he complains. On the other hand, some of the con-
spirators whose activities injured the private claimant may have been too low in
the conspiracy to be selected as named defendants or co-conspirators in the Gov-
ernment's necessarily broader net.
Id. at 63-64.
The Court's explanation of the differences in the parties named is technically correct in
the abstract; however, a trial court entertaining a motion for dismissal because of the run-
ning of the statute of limitations is in a position to do more than merely speculate.
Whatever reasons led the government not to name, or even identify, an alleged conspirator
should not prevent a court from taking into account the very significant fact that the gov-
ernment did not do so.
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The private plaintiff is not required to allege that the same means
were used to achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies
by the same defendants. Rather, effect must be given to the broad
terms of the statute itself -'based in whole or in part on any
matter complained of'- read in light of Congress' belief that pri-
vate antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective
enforcement of the antitrust laws. Doubtlessly, care must be exer-
cised to insure that reliance upon the government proceeding is
not mere sham and that the matters complained of in the govern-
ment suit bear a real relation to the private plaintiff's claim for
relief. But the courts must not allow a legitimate concern that
invocation of § 5(b) be made in good faith to lead them into a
niggardly construction of the statutory language here in
question.49
The Supreme Court further expanded its view of the "based in
whole or in part" language of section 5(i) in Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc..50 In Zenith, the sole defendant sued had
been named neither as a defendant nor as a conspirator in the ear-
lier government suit.51 The litigation was before the Court, how-
ever, after lengthy pretrial and trial proceedings that had estab-
lished that the defendant participated in at least part of the
conspiracy that was the target of the government action.52 In light
of that showing the Court saw "nothing destructive of Congress'
purpose in holding that [section 5(i)] tolls the statute of limita-
tions against all participants in a conspiracy which is the object of
a government suit, whether or not they are named as defendants or
conspirators therein." 53
" Id. at 59 (quoting Minnesota Mining, 381 U.S. at 318) (emphasis added).
50 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
1 Id. at 337. In Zenith, the prior government suit was United States v. General Elec.
Co., Civil Action No. 140-157 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1962), which involved a government anti-
trust action against various defendants who were charged with restraining the export of
American-made radio and television sets by refusing to grant patent licenses to American
manufacturers. See 401 U.S. at 323, 333-34 & n.6. This action was terminated on Nov. 1,
1962, when a consent decree was entered against the final defendant named in the govern-
ment action. See id. at 333 n.5.
12 401 U.S. at 337-38. The defendant in Zenith, although not named in the prior gov-
ernment action, participated in patent pools in Canada, Great Britain and Australia, along
with those defendants named in the government action. Id. at 323, 337-38.
11 Id. at 336. The Court set forth two situations in addition to that in Zenith in which
the period of limitations would toll when private defendants were not participants in the
government's suit. See id. at 335. First, if the government does not name or identify co-
conspirators, but alleges and proves at trial that others were in fact co-conspirators, the
statute will toll as to the co-conspirators even though they were not named in the prior
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Notwithstanding the very broad sweep of the Supreme Court's
decisions, the lower courts have increasingly limited the scope of
the "based in whole or in part" language. For example, one court
ruled that the statute of limitations does not toll when the govern-
ment's case involves some of the same defendants, but is otherwise
different, involving different activities and different periods of
time. 4 Section 5(i) also has been held inapplicable when the al-
leged illegal conduct is different from and unconnected to the prior
proceeding,55 as well as when there is no common element of con-
action. Id. Second, if the government did not make an evidentiary showing as to the pur-
ported co-conspirator in the prior action, but such a showing is made in the subsequent civil
action, the statute will toll as to all co-conspirators. Id.
A practical result of the broad net cast by the Supreme Court in Zenith is that private
treble damage actions may have to be severed at the trial stage pursuant to Rule 42 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) ("court in furtherance of conve-
nience or to avoid prejudice . . . may order a separate trial"). Because the Clayton Act
allows a private plaintiff to use for its prima facie case a final judgment against a defendant
in an antitrust action brought by the government, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982), a private defen-
dant not a party to the government's suit would surely move to have the private action
severed. One significant limitation, however, is that a plea of nolo contendere is not admissi-
ble against a defendant in a civil action. City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825,
834 (9th Cir. 1964). Furthermore, a government judgment is not admissible against a defen-
dant not subject to that judgment. Buckhead Theatre Co. v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 327 F.2d
365, 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F.
Supp. 35, 59 (D. Minn. 1966), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377
F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967). A trial court, in a civil action case
involving defendants who were not part of a prior government proceeding, would have dis-
cretion either to block admission of the government judgment in its entirety (surely to be
opposed by the plaintiff) or to sever the suit along the lines of defendants against whom the
judgment is or is not admissible as prima facie evidence. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRArICE AND PROCEDURE § 2388 (1971).
5 Peto v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 384 F.2d 682, 683 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 989 (1968). In Peto, the plaintiff alleged that a professional hockey conspiracy
prevented him from building a competing hockey arena. Id. at 683. In support of a § 5(i)
statute of limitations toll, the plaintiff cited United States v. International Boxing Club, 150
F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), afl'd, 358 U.S. 242 (1959), as the prior government action. See
384 F.2d at 683. In International Boxing the government had instituted a civil action to
eliminate restraints of trade and monopolization in the professional boxing industry, partic-
ularly in the sale of media rights. 150 F. Supp. at 400. The existence of some of the same
defendants was the only common ground in the two actions. See Peto, 384 F.2d at 683. The
Peto court held that the conspiracies were entirely different and therefore did not apply the
tolling provision. Id.; accord Charley's Tour & Transp., Inc. v. InterIsland Resorts, Ltd.,
1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,703 (D. Hawaii 1985) (tolling provision unavailable because
private plaintiff's suit based on conspiracy primarily affecting market different from one
involved in government's suit).
Il Maricopa County v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp. 77, 89-90 (D. Ariz.
1969), aff'd per curiam, 431 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 937 (1971). In
Maricopa, the plaintiff sought to toll the statute of limitations under § 5(i), based on an
FTC proceeding against the defendant in a prior government action. Id. at 89. The court,
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spiracy between the two proceedings."
C. The "Pendency"
Private plaintiffs may take advantage of the suspension of the
statute of limitations during, and for up to one year after, the
"pendency" of a government action.5 7 Any suit based upon a gov-
ernment proceeding is time-barred at the end of that.year.5
As a general matter the pendency of a government action
ceases when a final judgment effected against the last remaining
defendant has been resolved on appeal,59 or, if no appeal is taken
from that judgment, when the time for appeal expires.6 0 The
courts, however, have not uniformly followed those general rules.
however, determined that the FTC proceeding was insufficient to invoke the toll. Id. The
court reasoned that the alleged monopolistic acts in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act were unrelated to defendant's acts forming the basis for the FTC proceeding, which was
brought under § 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 89-90.
5 Aurora Enters., Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 688 F.2d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 1982),
afg in relevant part 524 F. Supp. 655, 661 (C.D. Cal. 1981). In Aurora, the plaintiff, in a
suit against NBC, attempted to take advantage of prior government suits against NBC's
rivals, ABC and CBS. 524 F. Supp. at 661. The government had brought a similar suit
against NBC but since that action had ended more than one year prior to the plaintiff's suit,
it was unavailable for tolling purposes. 688 F.2d at 693. Notwithstanding that the public and
private suits were linked by similar issues of syndication rights, the Ninth Circuit, agreeing
with the district court, ruled that the plaintiff's action was not within the purview of the
tolling provision since no conspiracy had been alleged in the prior government suits. Id.
57 See Minnesota Mining, 381 U.S. at 314; Russ Toggs, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 426 F.2d
850, 857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); Grengs v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 232 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1976); Vermont v. Cayuga Rock
Salt Co., 276 F. Supp. 970, 971 (D. Me. 1967).
"' See, e.g., Chandler Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Morgan Drive-Away, Inc., 1981-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 66,418 (W.D. Ark. 1981) (filing of private action on June 30, 1977, not within
one-year of termination of government action on June 30, 1976).
" New Jersey v. Morton Salt Co., 387 F.2d 94, 98-99 (3d Cir. 1967). The statute of
limitations was tolled in Morton Salt pending the resolution on appeal even though a con-
sent decree was entered years earlier. Id.; accord Maricopa County v. American Pipe & Con-
str. Co., 303 F. Supp. 77, 87 (D. Ariz. 1969) (statute tolled until one year after final judg-
ments as to all defendants in prior government action), affd per curiam, 431 F.2d 1145 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 937 (1971); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brook-
side Theatre Corp., 194 F.2d 846, 857-58 (8th Cir.) (case pending until final decree either
affirmed by the Supreme Court or time for appeal expired), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942
(1952); Barnett v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 112 F. Supp. 5, 7 (N.D. Ill. 1953)
(pendency on government suit ends when appellate proceedings are concluded or parties
agree to judgment).
60 Russ Toggs, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 426 F.2d 850, 857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
878 (1970); Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 193 F. Supp. 401, 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 761 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Electric Theatre Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937, 944
(W.D. Mo. 1953).
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Courts have instead picked different termination dates for a gov-
ernment proceeding on appeal; it has been marked at the time of
the denial of the petition for certiorari,6' the date after which a
petition for rehearing could have been filed following the denial of
the certiorari petition, 2 the Supreme Court's affirmance of the
judgment below, 63 or the date on which the Supreme Court denied
rehearing.64
The manner in which a government proceeding is resolved has
been a critical factor influencing "pendency." The "normal" rules
regarding pendency have been avoided in government antitrust
proceedings involving consent decrees and nolo contendere pleas.
When a consent decree is entered, it is the date of entry, not the
expiration of the time for appeal, from which the one year period is
calculated.65 Similarly, when a defendant pleads nolo contendere
in a criminal antitrust suit, courts have ruled that. pendency, for
purposes of a subsequent civil action, ceases at the entry of the
61 See, e.g., Luria Steel & Trading Corp. v. Ogden Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1238, 1240-41
(E.D. Pa. 1972), afl'd on other grounds, 484 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1158 (1974). The Luria court argued that placing the termination date at any time other
than the date on which certiorari is denied would force subsequent plaintiffs to read all
motions and papers from previous government action. Id.
62 Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073, 1078 (10th Cir. 1975).
The Monarch court stated that the losing certiorari petitioners had twenty-five days in
which to file a petition for rehearing and that even though no petition was filed, the case
was "pending" in the Supreme Court during that time. Id.
63 See New Jersey v. Morton Salt Co., 387 F.2d 94, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 967 (1968); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 46, 53 (D. Minn. 1966),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967).
6 See Baldwin v. Loew's Inc., 312 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1963); Skouras Theatres
Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 193 F. Supp. 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Leonia
Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
65 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 333 n.5 (1971); Yoder
Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1363 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); Potts v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
61,538 (N.D. Okla. 1977); see also KWF Indus., Inc. v. AT&T, 592 F. Supp. 795 (D.D.C.
1984) (filing of consent decree, not the lodging of same, terminated government's suit for
purposes of § 5(i)). Provisions in a consent decree reserving the power to enforce or modify
the decree, or requiring the performance of certain acts, do not affect the pendency for
tolling purposes. See Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284, 293-94
(7th Cir. 1954); Maricopa County v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp. 77, 90 (D.
Ariz. 1969), affd per curiam, 431 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 937
(1971). A decree in which the government reserves the right to vacate the decree within a
certain period to seek the relief initially sought, however, is not final for purposes of estab-
lishing a date from which to calculate the one-year period. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. Brookside Theatfe Corp., 194 F.2d 846, 857 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942
(1952).
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judgment of conviction."6
D. "Commenced Action Within the Period of Suspension or
Within Four Years After the Cause of Action Accrued"
In light of the accrual standard explicitly adopted by Congress
when it enacted section 4B of the Clayton Act,67 this provision
would appear to be straightforward-a timely claim could be filed
one year after the government proceeding ceased to "pend" or four
years after the last overt act causing injury or damage.6 s In two
instances involving the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, how-
ever, this provision of section 5(i) could be considered ambiguous.6 9
"6 See Marine Firemen's Union v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 503 F.2d 246, 249-
50 (9th Cir. 1974); Maricopa County v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp. 77, 83 (D.
Ariz. 1969), affd per curiam, 431 F.2d 1145 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 937 (1971). This
rule makes a great deal of sense because convictions pursuant to a nolo contendere plea
cannot be attacked on the merits; they can be challenged on appeal only for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, or because the indictment fails to charge an offense. See United States
v. Bessimer & Lake Erie R.R., 717 F.2d 593, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
In Marine Firemen's, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit criticized the varying
rules enunciated by other courts. See 503 F.2d at 250. The court stated that these varying
rules resulted in "[c] ase law chaos" and lack of uniformity in determining the termination of
the pendency of a criminal proceeding, and therefore held that "the 'pendency' of the re-
lated criminal proceeding ... terminates at the procedural point and date of the clerk's
notation in the 'criminal docket' for the case of the entry of the judge's signed written judg-
ment of conviction of the last remaining defendant in the criminal proceeding." Id.
6' See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
e See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra note 6. Fraudulent concealment is an old chancery doctrine that was ap-
plied in Supreme Court decisions when the elements of fraud or deceit were clearly estab-
lished. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S.(21 Wall.) 342
(1874). In Bailey, the landmark case in the area of fraudulent concealment, the Supreme
Court determined that the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, which had a two-year statute of limita-
tions, was tolled by the concealment of the parties' fraudulent conduct. See 88 U.S. at 348.
The fraudulent concealment doctrine is not applicable merely because there is evidence
of secrecy, silence, concealment or other clandestine activities by the alleged conspirators. If
it were, the 4-year limitation period Congress adopted in 1955 would be of no practical
significance for antitrust conspiracies, most of which obviously operate in clandestine fash-
ion, with the participants seeking to keep their covert machinations hidden from public
view. Courts have therefore consistently held that conduct which adds up to "mere non-
disclosure or denial does not constitute fraud or deceit for tolling purposes; otherwise, the
tolling exception to the statute of limitations would eclipse the basic statute itself." In re
Fertilizer Antitrust Litigation, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,894, at 79,178 (E.D. Wash.
1979); accord Dayco Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 386 F. Supp. 546, 548 (N.D. Ohio
1974) (mere "passive concealment" through silence or non-disclosure does not justify tolling
the statute of limitations), afl'd sub nom. Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523
F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1975); Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250
(9th Cir. 1978) (outright denial of wrongdoing to prospective plaintiff does not constitute
fraudulent concealment). Three elements must be pleaded and proven to establish fraudu-
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In the first instance, a private plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to
an enlarged period of time in which to recover treble damages (i.e.,
for more than four years) because of the interplay of the defen-
dant's fraudulent concealment and the government proceeding.70
The private plaintiff attempts to "tack on" the period of fraudu-
lent concealment to the beginning of the government proceeding.7'
When a plaintiff can successfully demonstrate acts by the defen-
dant constituting fraudulent concealment of the plaintiff's accrued
claims within four years prior to the commencement of a govern-
ment proceeding, that plaintiff is entitled to damages covering
three periods: the period during which the claims were fraudu-
lently concealed, the period of the government proceeding, and the
period until which private action was filed-as long as this period
lent concealment: 1) wrongful concealment of their actions by the defendants; 2) failure of
the plaintiff to discover the operative facts that are the basis of his cause of action within
the limitations period cause of action; and 3) plaintiff's exercise of due diligence until dis-
covery of the facts. Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir.
1975) (quoting Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1974)). These ele-
ments have their source in rule nine of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which mandates
that the party alleging fraudulent concealment must plead with particularity the circum-
stances giving rise to the fraud. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Because of the strong policies underlying statutes of limitations, the application of the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment "is usually very much restricted." Geromette v. General
Motors Corp., 609 F.2d 1200, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 985 (1980). Accord-
ingly, a heavy burden of proof is on the party seeking to toll the statute - "[a]ll presump-
tions are against him, since his claim to exemption is against the current of the law and is
founded on exceptions." Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp., 496 F.2d 230, 233 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974); see Sukow Borax Mine Consolidated, Inc. v. Borax
Consolidated, Ltd., 185 F.2d 196, 209 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951);
Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615, 620 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment has been em-
ployed to toll the Clayton Act statute of limitations with increasing frequency in private
litigation. See, e.g., Norton-Children's Hosps., Inc. v. James E. Smith & Sons, Inc., 658 F.2d
440 (6th Cir. 1981); King & King Enters. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1981); Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1978); see
also Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Stan-
dard?, 71 GEo. L.J. 829, 833 & n.31 (1983); Comment, The Application of the Doctrine of
Fraudulent Concealment to Modern Federal Trade Conspiracy Cases, 14 CONN. L. REV. 115
(1981).
70 See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 698 n.26 (9th Cir.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978); supra note 35.
71 E.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1974); Maricopa
County v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp. 77, 84 (D. Ariz. 1969), aff'd per
curiam, 431 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 937 (1971); see also Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisely, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962) (tacking permitted to en-
able antitrust plaintiffs to sue in 1958 for acts occurring in 1938 because wartime tolling
statute added to period of government proceeding).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:70
is within one year of the end of the government suit. 2
The second instance of possible ambiguity is one in which a
private plaintiff invokes the doctrine of fraudulent concealment in
an attempt to circumvent the Clayton Act's time bar, notwith-
standing that its claims accrued more than four years before the
filing of its action and that it did not file suit within one year from
when the government proceeding ceased to pend. In such a case, a
private plaintiff attempts to "tack on" more than the one year per-
mitted after termination of the government proceeding, contending
that prior acts of concealment by the defendant continued to pre-
vent the plaintiff from asserting its claims in a timely fashion.
While there is virtually no case law in this area, s the statute and
its legislative history clearly support a time bar to such claims.74
71 See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 698 & n.26 (9th Cir.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495
F.2d 448, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1974); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 567-
72 (10th Cir. 1962); Maricopa County v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp. 77, 84-
86 (D. Ariz. 1969), afl'd per curiam, 431 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 937
(1971).
7' Two federal courts declined to address the issue of an antitrust suit tolled by fraudu-
lent concealment and brought within one year after the government proceeding ceased to
pend. See Chambers & Barber, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 455
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Althoff's, Inc. v. Sterling Faucet Co., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 74,066 (N.D.
Ill. 1972).
The defendant in Chambers moved to strike the allegations of the complaint that
charged fraudulent concealment up until the government proceeding on March 11, 1971. 60
F.R.D. at 456. The government proceeding terminated by a consent judgment on April 15,
1971, and the private suit was subsequently filed more than a year later on April 24, 1972.
Id. Since the issue had been raised in the wrong procedural mode, the court declined to
resolve the issue until there was a motion brought to dismiss on the ground that the suit was
time barred. Id. at 457-58.
In Sterling Faucet, the plaintiff's private action was held timely. See 1972 Trade Cas.
(CCH) at 92,411. Plaintiff made undisputed allegations of fraudulent concealment up until
the date of the government proceeding and the suit was brought within four years of initia-
tion of the government proceeding. Id. However, there was not a clear indication as to when
the government proceeding ceased to pend. Id.
7' See 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982). As previously set forth, Congress used an accrual stan-
dard for the Clayton Act's statute of limitations period, and explicitly rejected a "discovery-
type" standard. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. In providing the alternate periods
in section 5(i), Congress used the same accrual standard, to the extent the private suit was
not filed within the one-year period. See supra note 7. It would thus appear to be at odds
with the clear language of the statute to allow a plaintiff to "tack on" the four years after
the accrual of a cause of action and more than one year after the termination of the govern-
ment proceeding. See id. However, suit could be brought after the one year period if the
cause of action had accrued less than four years before. See Comment, Clayton Act Statute
of Limitations and Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment, 72 YALE L.J. 600, 601 n.18 (1963);
Comment, supra note 6, at 329.
That the aforementioned articulations of Congress's purpose, see supra notes 1, 5, 14, &
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Moreover, the equitable principles underlying the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment seem to be inapplicable when the govern-
ment has instituted a well-publicized antitrust proceeding, thereby
putting potential plaintiffs on notice of the defendant's injurious
acts and their resulting possible claims.75
IHI.
FUTURE APPLICATION OF SECTION 5(i)
The goal of Congress in amending section 5(i)-to bring "cer-
tainty and predictability" to its application-clearly has not been
accomplished. In view of the Supreme Court's broad reading of the
statute in the Minnesota Mining, Leh and Zenith trilogy, the
thirty-year existence of section 5(i) has been anything but stable,
despite the lower courts' struggle to develop notions of jurispru-
dential consistency. In recent years, however, there has been a dis-
cernible trend, led by the Supreme Court, toward a more restric-
tive reading of section 5(i), one more consistent with congressional
intent.70 That trend, together with the already extant body of case
21, are determinative is well settled. The fraudulent concealment doctrine, being merely an
old equitable doctrine, is applicable to toll statutes of limitations only in the absence of
clear expressions of legislative intent to the contrary. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135
(1879); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342 (1875); Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d
271, 274 (8th Cir. 1962) ("legislative will is the all important or controlling factor"), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963). As stated in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), when
Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created-as it
has in section 5(i)-that is the "end of the matter." Id. at 395.
75 See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311,
319 (1965). While tolling by reason of fraudulent concealment is directly tied to affirmative
conduct of the defendants, e.g., American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559
(1974), the one-year government suspension period is not based, in any way, on such con-
duct. Rather, the one-year provision assumes such conduct is out in the open, with the one
year designed to assist affirmatively the bringing of suits within that defined, and limited,
period of time.
7' The most recent restriction on § 5(i) is found in Charley's Tour & Transp., Inc., v.
InterIsland Resorts, Ltd., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 66,703 (D. Hawaii 1985), in which the
federal district court ruled that the Clayton Act's statute of limitations was not tolled by a
government suit, notwithstanding that there were defendants common to both proceedings,
there was an interrelation of theories between the government's and the private plaintiffs'
suits, and the same people were impacted upon in each proceeding. Id. at 63,366. On the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court closely examined the two suits and
determined that the private plaintiffs' suit was aimed at a conspiracy primarily affecting a
market different from the one involved in the government's suit. Id. Building upon that
determination, the court reasoned that "[t]o extend § 5(i) to this situation would mean that
a defendant doing business in different markets would have the statute of limitations tolled
as to all of its markets," and such a result would not only be "inequitable" but would also
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
law, should be of considerable assistance to both private plaintiffs
and defendants, in reducing risks and uncertainty in most in-
stances. With respect to unforeseen circumstances (and imagina-
tive arguments of counsel), courts in the future will presumably
continue to be more sensitive to the original purposes of Congress
in amending section 5(i), and attempt to reach results that will en-
gender more, rather than less, "certainty and predictability."
"frustrate" the congressional goal of certainty and predictability "by removing any certainty
as to when a cause of action was barred." Id. There can be little doubt that the Leh Court
would have ruled differently from the Hawaii district court. See supra notes 45-49 and ac-
companying text.
[Vol. 60:70
